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Hughes: Creditors' Self-Help Remedies under UCC Section 9-503: Violative

CREDITORS' SELF-HELP REMEDIES UNDER UCC
SECTION 9-503: VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS IN TEXAS?
DAVID HUGHES*
The United States Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.' and Fuentes v. Shevin 2 has enunciated the doctrine that the due
process clause of the 14th amendment requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizure of property in pursuit of remedies involving state or governmental action. Sniadach held unconstitutional
a Wisconsin statute3 which permitted a creditor to obtain a prejudgment garnishment of a debtor's wages without provisions for notice
and prior hearing before the garnishment order was issued and exe4
cuted. Due to some unfortunate language in the opinion of the Court,
the scope of the decision was rendered somewhat uncertain. While
some decisions did not limit the holding to specified types of property,5 the dispute as to the scope of Sniadach was subsequently resolved, to a large extent, by Fuentes. The Court held that the replevin
statutes of the States of Florida and Pennsylvania, authorizing seizure
of goods by a sheriff upon application of a creditor without opportunity for a hearing, violated the due process clause. 6
While many prejudgment remedies in Texas requiring action by state
officers such as garnishments and sequestration are now constitutionally suspect under Sniadach and Fuentes,7 the repossession of goods
by a secured creditor, not directly calling upon state officials to act in
the taking of such property, raises the question of whether there has
* Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Transportation Division; B.A., University
of Texas; J.D., Washington College of Law.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

3. Wis. L. 1965, c. 507, § 1, as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.02(2) (Supp.
1973).
4. Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Sniadach stated: "We deal here with
wages--a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system." Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). There was some
speculation that the holding would be restricted to wage garnishment.
5. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare payments); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license).
6. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
7. TEx. R. Civ. P. 657-679; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (1966); see
Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., - S.W.2d - (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
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involvement to support a claim of denial of due
article will deal primarily with constitutional atcourts on self-help repossession under Section 9Commercial Code,' it will also attempt to define

the acts essential to constitute state action that may arise under state
court decisions as well. The ensuing discussion will further analyze
the validity of waivers of notice and pre-hearing seizures in the light of
Fuentes.
JURISDICTION AND THE "STATE ACTION" PROBLEM

In federal courts there must be satisfaction of jurisdictional as well
as substantive requirements.' Only when a federal court has decided
that there has been "state action" may it then determine whether such
state action was a denial of due process.' 0 While a state court faces
no jurisdictional limitations, there can be no recognized claim of deprivation of a federally protected right unless the substantive "state action" is present.
Numerous federal courts have concluded that no such state action is
present when a secured creditor repossesses goods pursuant to section
9-503 and have dismissed due process challenges to such self-help reAdams v. Egley' was one of the first federal cases to
possessions.'
hold that self-help repossession does constitute state action and is violative of due process.' 3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently reversed this decision, however, holding that repossession of
8. When in the context of Texas law, the Uniform Commercial Code citations will
be to the Texas version: TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (1968). The section
provides in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by
action.
9. When "federal question" jurisdiction is alleged, there must be more than $10,000 in controversy and sufficient "state action" so that the case "arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Jurisdiction may also be invoked by "Civil Rights" under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). The
substantive claim, the alleged deprivation of rights, must occur "under color of" state
law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948).
11. Colvin v. Avco Fin. Servs. Inc., CCH SECURED TRANS. GUmE %52,046, at 67,141
(N.D. Utah Jan. 4, 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Colo. 1972);
Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
12. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom., Adams v. Southern Cal.
52,216, at 67,306 (9th Cir. Oct. 4,
First Nat'l Bank, CCH SECURED TRANS. GUmE
1973).
13. Id. at 617.
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motor vehicles by self-help on default of payment where there is a
contract providing for such is not an act under color of state law and
is not, therefore, state action within the meaning of the due process
clause. 4 In Adams, the debtors had signed security agreements and
each subsequently defaulted with the vehicles being repossessed by the
secured parties without judicial process. The California statute which
was at issue in Adams is identical to that of Texas, both being duplicate enactments of section 9-503.11 Since this section authorizes repossession without resort to judicial process, the principal barrier in determining that self-help repossession is accomplished under color of state
law is the complete lack of participation by any state official. Conversely, private citizens who act in concert with state officers are considered to be clothed with state action. '1
In seeking to determine the outer limits of state action, the case of
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority17 is instructive. In Burton,
a restaurant which had leased space in a parking facility owned by
a state agency had discriminated against Blacks. State action was
found even though the state had done nothing to encourage the wrongful action other than enter into the lease with its tenant. In announcing
a balancing test, the Court stated: "[o]nly by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the State
The Supreme
in private conduct be attributed its true significance."'"
19
Court, in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., has further defined the relationship of state action, at least where racial discrimination is involved, by announcing that a private individual, who discriminates on
the basis of race with knowledge of and pursuant to a state enforced
custom requiring such action, is a participant in joint activity with the
14. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, CCH SECURED TRANS. GuimE

52,216, at 67,306 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
15. Compare CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (Deering 1963), with TEx. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. § 9.503 (1968).
16. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Williams v. United States, 341
U.S. 97 (1951). Price, however, involved private conduct of a criminal nature taken
in concert with state law enforcement officers in an indirect attempt to avoid discrimination prohibitions. Williams was concerned with a private detective who held a special
police officer's card issued by the city of Miami and who used brutal methods of ob-

taining confessions from suspects accused of stealing from the detective's corporate employer.
17. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
18. Id. at 722.
19. 398 U.S. 144 (1970); accord, Reitman v.Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state
action found where no state official had participated in a homeowner's refusal to rent
an available apartment to plaintiffs solely because of their race).
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state under color of state custom or law.2" This expansion of the definition of state action was limited somewhat by the Supreme Court in
Moose Lodge v. Irvis.21 The case dealt with a private club member
whose Black guest was refused service because of his race. State action was asserted on the grounds that the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority had issued a liquor license to the club; however, the Court held
that the liquor regulations, with one exception,2 2 did not in any way
foster or encourage the wrongful private conduct as to constitute state
involvement in the actions of the club. 23 The relevance and soundness
of using racial discrimination cases to determine whether there has
been "state action" in the enactment of section 9-503 is questionable
and has been rejected in several decisions. 24 Concluding that selfhelp repossession by a private party is made under color of state law
and analagous to racial discrimination is inconsistent with both the
purpose and development of the law under the Civil Rights Acts. Problems of racial discrimination cases, which evidence a pattern of intentional indirect efforts to circumvent constitutional rights, are unlike
the self-help creditor's remedy which is based on economic grounds of
long standing2" and are best left for state courts and legislatures.
Public Function Test
One theoretical method used in attempting to find state action in
self-help repossessions is the so-called "public function" 26 test as fol20. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 (1970).
21. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
22. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972). The exception arises
when a state regulation requires a local private club to adhere to all provisions
of that organization's national constitution and by-laws which result in constitutional
deprivations. The Court found that state sanction in this instance would constitute
state action.
23. Id. at 173.
24. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972); accord, Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc.,
295 A.2d 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972).
25. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, CCH SECURED TRANS. GUiDE 52,216,
at 67,164 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973), citing Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d
1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (criminal prosecution under counterpart statute to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for irregularities in the conduct of a state Democratic party primary);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state law controlled Texas primaries and
Democratic Party held to be agent of state when private political party excluded Negroes from voting which constituted a 14th amendment violation); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (Texas County political group excluded Negroes from preprimary
elections constituting state action, either because the state permitted the only effective
election or because the private group performed a state function). These cases are
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lowed in Hall v. Garson.1
The facts arising out of Hall reveal the
seizure of a portable television set by a landlady from the tenant's apartment under the authority of the Baggage Lien for Rent statute 2 which
gives the landlord a lien on the personal property of a tenant in rented
premises. The statute additionally authorized the enforcement of that
lien through peremptory seizure of the property by the landlord.29
Chief Judge Brown, in holding state action was present which deprived
the tenant of due process rights, wrote:
In this case the alleged wrongful conduct was admittedly perpetrated by a person who was not an officer of the state or an official of any state agency. But the action taken, the entry into
another's home and the seizure of another's property, was an act
that possesses many, if not all, of the characteristics of an act of
the State. 0
Hall turns on the issue of intrusion into another's home and the seizure
of property8 ' owned by a tenant not subject to a prior contractual security interest. Since the factual situation in Hall constitutes a breach of
the peace, it is distinguishable from a peaceable repossession under section 9-503.32 It is within this narrow area which private parties may
contractually reserve a security interest and peaceably repossess without
the necessity of judicial process.

Statutory Changes in the Common Law
Closely related to the preceding discussion, regarding determination
of state action by the public function test, is the occurrence of a statutory alteration of a common law rule or practice, as opposed to a mere
codification of it. In proceedings where state action is sought to be
identified, the assertion is made that when a statutory change so alters a
common law rule or practice, the new legislation can be regarded as endistinguishable from self-help repossession as they are restricted to racial discrimination
in voting, which is specifically prohibited by the 15th amendment.
27. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5238a (1962), as amended Tax. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN.art. 5236d (Supp. 1974).

29. Id.
30. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. This is not to suggest that because we have a property right involved, there
is no federal constitutional issue. In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
549 (1972), the Supreme Court rejected any limitation on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to actions based on personal rights as opposed to property
rights.
32. Texas permits self-help repossession only when it can be accomplished without
a breach of the peace. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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couragement of a state policy. 33 The rationale is that a change in
policy can be more readily identified as a source of encouragement for
private conduct than a traditional policy of long standing.
Texas law prior to the enactment of the Texas version of section 9-503
did not provide a secured creditor the right to possession of the collateral
upon default unless such a right was expressly provided for in the agreement creating the security interest. 4 While it would appear that there is
some encouragement by the State of Texas of a new policy in the enactment of section 9.503, since now the secured creditor has the right of
repossession unless expressly excluded, section 9.503 as presently applied works no real change upon the prior common law right to take
possession, since there must be acquiescence or assent by the debtor for
the repossession to be effected without force or other breach of the
peace.3 5 Also without parallel provision in prior Texas law is the express recognition in section 9.503 of the secured party's right, if provided for in the agreement, to compel the debtor upon default to assemble the collateral and make it available at a convenient place designated by the secured party. Prior Texas law did provide, however,
that the parties might make any agreement with respect to the collateral
which did not violate the law, and it is submitted that such recitation
in section 9.503 does not result in state action as such would have
been enforceable under the prior Texas law.
In a broader sphere, statutorily authorized self-help does not represent a radical change from common law. As reported by Pollack
and Maitland,30 for a long time the law as to repossession by creditors was very weak and, as a practical matter, could not prevent selfhelp of the most violent kind. Fairly early in legal history, however,
the law began to prohibit in uncompromising terms any and every attempt to substitute force for judgment. This was especially true of the
English law in the 13th century. Subsequently, however, the legal at33. E.g., Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust, 361 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. Mass.
1973); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 394 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim
v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
34. E.g., Montgomery v. Collins, 32 S.W. 1067, 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no
writ).
35. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Rios, 96 Tex. 174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903); Harling
v. Creech, 88 Tex. 300, 31 S.W. 357 (1895) provided for mortgagee under a chattel
mortgage to take possession of the mortgaged property in the event of default if accomplished without force. This was construed to be a contractual right derived from
the mortgage instrument itself and not from the statutory authority of TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5490 (Chattel Mortgages).
36. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 574 (2d ed. 1899).
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titude toward the use of force in repossessions grew less strict, again
allowing a controlled self-help remedy to the creditor. 37 In view of the
common law's later tradition of peaceful self-help as well as the con,
trolled conditions existing today under section 9.503, there is no necessity to return to 13th century rationale and the desire to abolish selfhelp.
ContractualExclusion
Following prior Texas law closely is the premise that state action may
be excluded on the basis of a written security agreement or contract
between debtor and creditor which incorporates the statutory language
into the terms of the agreement.18 The creditor can be said to hold
the right to repossess based solely on the agreement, the enforcement
of which is not contingent upon any statutory enactment. Therefore,
even if the rationale prevails that section 9.503 changes prior law, and
further, that this change constitutes state action, the presence of a written agreement embodying the provisions of section 9.503 should preclude any action under color of state law, assuming adequate notice
and waiver procedures satisfy due process requirements.
In McCormick v. First National Bank, 9 a federal district court upheld the Florida version of section 9-503 in connection with an automobile repossession. 40 The action was based on a contractual agreement that gave the creditor an independent right to repossession which
rendered the existence of state involvement irrelevant. The court, by
way of dicta, went on to state: "If the portion of the Code involved did
not exist as law in this state, such provision could have been set forth
' 41
word for word in the contract signed by plaintiffs.
FUENTES:

WAIVERS OF NOTICE AND PRE-SEIZURE HEARINGS

Exceptions
The Supreme Court in Fuentes recognized "extraordinary situations"
that would justify postponing notice and opportunity for hearing.4
The Court laid down three situations, which all being present, would
37. Id. at 574. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79 n.12 (1972), the Court similarly reviewed the English common law and recognized the use of self-help remedies
as long as no state action is involved.
38. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Rios, 96 Tex. 174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903).
39. 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
40. Id. at 606.
41. Id. at 606.
42. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 64, 90-91 (1972).
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result in a recognized exception; (1) seizure is necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest; (2) there is a special need for prompt action; and (3) the state keeps strict control over
the use of legitimate force.4"

While the mere interest of the creditor

in collecting his debt was not sufficient in Fuentes to constitute an

important general public interest,4 4 the Court did say that there may be
cases where the creditor could show immediate danger and the neces-

sity for prompt action when a debtor threatened to destroy or conceal
property subject to seizure.',

Prompt repossession of security is imperative in certain instances,
especially in the case of automobiles which are easily concealed or sold
by the debtor. Even if it be shown, however, that situations exist
in which prompt repossession is vital, section 9.503 is not so "narrowly
drawn to meet. . . such unusual conditions,"46 as required by the second criterion of Fuentes. Section 9.503 further places the control of
the use of self-help repossession entirely in the hands of private per-

sons, 47 with the state exercising no restraint so long as the repossession
is peaceable.

This abdication of state control contravenes the third

criterion as set out in Fuentes-thatthe state exercise strict control over
the use of legitimate force.

It is submitted again, however, that courts

could continue to uphold summary repossession on the basis of common law tradition, as an independent contractual right, or merely on
lack of state action, rather than attempting to pigeon-hole the self-

help remedy within the ambit of enumerated exceptions.
Is a Pre-Seizure Hearing Required?

The Court in Fuentes did not specify the type of proceeding that
43. In announcing these exceptions the Court cited prior cases as examples: Ownby
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1920) (attachment necessary for securing jurisdiction in a state
court) (public interest); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (protection against bank failure); North American Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food).
44. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 64, 92 (1972).
45. Id. at 93.
46. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
47. This analysis prevailed in Green v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672
(W.D. Va. 1972), wherein the Virginia statutory version of UCC § 9-503 was challenged. The court held passive state action resulted when a private citizen repossessed
an automobile for a bank and was therefore not violative of due process. There must
be active and direct state action by an official or by a branch of government. Id.
at 674; see, Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972) (automobile repossession effected by breach of the peace but case dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction).
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would be required prior to seizure under the due process clause, leaving
this matter for the state legislatures to decide.48 The Court did not
question the power of a state to seize goods before a final judgment
in order to protect the security interest of creditors so long as such
creditors were required to test their claim to the goods through the process of a fair hearing.49 Noting that "the nature and form of such prior
hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many potential variations," 0 the Court pointed to the basic principle that it considered fundamental in any notice and hearing procedure:
Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is
to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, however
it is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test. "[D]ue
process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' that
are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable
validity, or the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before
he can be deprived of his property. . .. "I'
The dissenting opinion in Fuentes summarized elements of the majority opinion's analysis of due process requirements thusly: (1)
notice of default from creditor to debtor; (2) a short period in which
the debtor may file objection to repossession; and (3) repossession if
no objection is filed; or (4) a pre-seizure hearing to establish a probable cause that default has occurred. 52 Assuming provisions will be
enacted for pre-seizure hearings by the state legislatures, the procedures will apply no doubt to all types of pre-seizure remedies, both
5
judicial and self-help.
Caution and protection of one's client, however, demand that some
form of prior notice and preliminary hearing be held prior to seizure un48. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
49. Id. at 96.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Id. at 97 (emphasis added), quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.

337 (1969).
52. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
White, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun in the dissenting opinion,
suggested that the debtor gains nothing significant under such procedures. Some abbreviated procedure will be necessary, however, to cope with the increased volume of
pre-seizure hearings that will likely result if self-help procedures are eliminated. Id.
at 103.
53. The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, through its
Review Committee for Article 9, had completed its final report on section 9-503 (April
25, 1971) before the constitutionality of self-help appeared on the scene. This suggests that there were no new demands or developments in commercial transactions that
prompted the Review Committee to make any recommended changes. See Coogan,
The New UCC Article 9, 86 H~Av. L. REv. 477, 563-66 (1973).
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til the question of self-help repossession has been settled in Texas."
Obviously there will be instances where this procedure will assist the
unscrupulous debtor in attempts to evade payment. The procedure,
however, will protect the debtor who believes he has a valid defense to
the creditor's claim and who has in the past suffered the loss of posses-

sion of his property even though he subsequently prevails at trial. The
stakes can be high for the creditor who wishes to assume the risk of selfhelp without the precaution of pre-seizure notice and hearing, as the
Civil Rights Statutes allow claims for damages as well as injunctive relief for violation of due process rights.5 5 Until the question of the
application of Fuentes to section 9.503 has been settled, a careful
lawyer will no doubt advise a creditor-client that some form of notice
and opportunity to be heard will be essential prior to seizure to guard
against a potential constitutional claim by the debtor.
ContractualWaivers
The Court in Fuentes left open the possibility that a debtor could
waive his right to notice and hearing.5 6 As Justice White makes clear
in his dissent, this possibility may easily avoid the effect of the majority
decision by spelling out clearly in the credit instruments that the creditor may regain possession of the property without a hearing and without
57
the necessity of judicial process.
54. The author has observed a growing tendency among practicing attorneys to
seek pre-seizure hearings in connection with writs of sequestration. To safeguard the
creditor's interest in property, where the facts indicate risks involved by leaving the
property in the debtor's possession, application is made for a temporary restraining order to prevent secretion or disposal of such property by the debtor prior to the preseizure hearing.
55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4) (1970) provides:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
56. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95-96 (1972).
57. Id. at 102 (dissenting opinion).
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In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,5 the Supreme Court held that
confession of judgment procedures5" are not per se violative of procedural due process.6 0 There are unique facets of this decision which are
particularly relevant in evaluating the effect of Fuentes. First, the
rationale in Overmyer may be shown to be analogous to any self-help,
prejudgment procedure based upon contractual waiver of a debtor's due
process rights to pretrial notice and hearing. 6 ' Second, the consumercreditors will have a much greater burden in proving a waiver of constitutional rights than commercial creditors, as Overmyer was a negotiated contract between two corporations, not a debtor-creditor contract of adhesion.6 2 In Fuentes, the contracts at issue were standard
form conditional sales contract agreements which contained waiver
clauses in fine print and were prepared for use by one party with a
strong bargaining position against another with a weak bargaining position; therefore, a discussion of the fine points of a contractual waiver defense by a repossessing creditor was not faced.
The possibility that a debtor may be permitted to waive any potential
right to notice and hearing is significant for section 9-503 transactions.
However, a note of caution is in order since there appear to be substantial limits on what may be done to constitute effective waiver.
58. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
59. Such procedure is of doubtful validity in Texas when used in connection with
prejudgment writs or self-help remedies due to the prohibitions of TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2224 (1971) which provides:
No acceptance of service and waiver of process, nor entry of appearance in open
court, nor a confession of judgment shall be authorized in any case by the contract
or writing sued on, or any other instrument executed prior to the institution of
such suit, nor shall such acceptance or waiver be made until after suit is brought.
The procedural counterpart is contained in TEX. R. Civ. P. 314 (judgment may subsequently be impeached for fraud or other equitable cause).
60. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
61. E.g., a debtor signs a cognovit note which grants the holder the right to enter
a personal judgment against him and sacrifices his rights to prejudgment notice and
hearing. This was done in Overmyer under an Ohio confession of judgment procedure.
OHio. REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Baldwin 1971).
62. The Court in Overmyer, in passing stated: "[W]here the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue." D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972). In Steven v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962), the court in discussing "contracts of adhesion," provided
a workable definition:
The term refers to a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to the
transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to the disparity
in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted
or rejected by the second party on a 'take it or leave it' basis, without opportunity
for bargaining and under such conditions that the 'adherer' cannot obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement.
Id. at 185.
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To be sure, the due process right of notice prior to a civil judgment
is subject to waiver as shown by Overmyer. The Supreme Court alluded to the qualifications for effective waiver in Fuentes as amounting
to one that is voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made.68 This is
primarily applicable to the commercial creditor-debtor sector, as there
is rarely equal bargaining position, either by experience or education,
in the consumer-debtor situation. In Fuentes, the contract language
was decidedly unclear to the uneducated debtor, so much so that the
Court did not even reach the questions of voluntariness of unintelligence in executing the contract. 64 The Court pointed out:
The conditional sales contracts here simply provided that upon
a default the seller "may take back," "may retake," or "may repossess" merchandise. The contracts included nothing about the
waiver of a prior hearing. They did not indicate how or through
what process-a final judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin
with a prior hearing, . . . the seller could take back the goods.
Rather, the purported waiver provisions here are no more than a
statement of the seller's right to repossession upon occurrence of
certain events.6
The due process clause has been held applicable to self-help under
section 9-503 due to ineffective waiver in several lower federal court
decisions. In Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc.,6 6 a decision involving repossession of a mobile home, a conditional sales contract governed by Vermont law contained the provisions of section 9-503 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in fine print. Upon default in payments, the defendant, acting as the creditor bank's agent, verbally notified the debtor of
intended repossession and the following day, gave notice formally of
such intent. The federal district court, in granting a preliminary injunction against the repossession, stated:
Other than the provisions of the sales agreement, the defendant
(Rex-Noreco) offered nothing to establish an effective waiver on
the part of the plaintiff (debtor) of her right to be heard. The
fine print in the conditional sales contract, without more, does not
constitute a voluntary and knowing surrender of her fundamental
right to be heard before being ousted and dispossessed of the home
she acquired under the purchase agreement.'
The court further stated that there was no compelling need for prompt
63.
64.
65.
66.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-95 (1972).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 95-96 (Court's emphasis).
CCH SECURED TRANS. GUIDE % 52,070, at 67,164 (D. Vt. Nov. 1, 1972).

67. Id.
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action through immediate seizure since no "extraordinary situation has
been demonstrated . . .within the permissible exceptions indicated in
Fuentes.

"68

In yet another decision, James v. Pinnix,69 a federal district court in
Mississippi has declared section 9-503 unconstitutional insofar as it
authorized the seizure of property without affording adequate prior notice and an opportunity for pre-seizure hearing, absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver of rights to same. 0 James involved a class action
pursuant to a conditional sales contract on an automobile, the contract
providing for repossession and waiver of notice, but was silent on the
waiver of a prior hearing. In deciding the case, the court cited
Fuentes as authority for enjoining the creditor from taking the automobile from the debtor until a hearing providing for adequate safeguards for due process was held."
Using waiver clauses in security agreements or other contractual instruments is fraught with peril. Normally, the consumer will not
avail himself of the assistance of counsel or understand or appreciate
the terms of such clause and furthermore, the consumer-debtor will
rarely, if ever, be in an equal bargaining position with the creditor. In
drafting contractual waiver clauses, such clauses should achieve at
least two objectives: (1) The clause should clearly and concisely state
the scope of the debtor's rights and that such are being waived; and (2)
the printed waiver material must be large and in conspicuous "boldface" print so as to attempt to show that the debtor had notice of such
waiver."2 After pursuing these minimal requirements of reasonable notice and clarity, the draftsman should then pursue the more important goal of avoiding or minimizing the possibility of adhesion. To
avoid the "take it or leave it" basis of such contract, it has been sug68. Id.
69. CCH SECURED TRANS. GuiDE 52,172, at 67,263 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 14, 1973).
70. Id.
71. Id. Both Michel and James are silent on any mention of state action or jurisdictional discussion, but it can be assumed this question was affirmatively decided, since
such is essential prior to a consideration of due process. But see Magro v. Lentini
Bros. Moving & Storage, 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on opinion below,
460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972). This case involved delivery of furniture to a warehouse for storage and subsequently sold at public auction
following notice. The court did not decide the question of state action involvement
because it determined that even if there was the presence of state action, there was
no deprivation of due process.
72. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95-96 (1972); accord, Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 724 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (fine print on back of conditional
sales contract ineffective waiver).
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gested that consideration be given the debtor for signing the waiver in
the hope of establishing equality of bargaining position between the
parties. 78 The consideration could be an offer by the lender to adjust
interest rates if the borrower signed a waiver or by a merchant offering
to reduce the carrying charges on the purchase price for a signed
waiver. The aim is to establish a meaningful choice for one of the
parties coupled with contract terms that are not unreasonably favorable
to the other party.
Attempting to draft meaningful waiver clauses is worthwhile and
not to be ignored; however, the creditor should also protect himself
further by obtaining a waiver after default but before seizure of a
debtor's property. While this will not always be effective due to hostile
or uncooperative debtors, it is a safer method to pursue when seeking to avoid the problem of an unequal bargaining position in an adhesion situation.
CONCLUSION

What may be the answer to the Fuentes self-help remedy puzzle
seems to be limited only by one's imagination, judging by the myriad
solutions currently being offered. Perhaps special procedures will have
to be designed by the legislature to provide a forum for pre-seizure
hearings in connection with waiver of rights, and notice and opportunity for objection to repossession by debtors. Or perhaps the Uniform
Commercial Code, which is intended to facilitate commercial transactions
be implementing their practice into its provisions, will provide an independent basis for an answer. For example, the UCC's general obligation of good faith could be imposed on the secured party in the
74
enforcement of the security agreement.
Until the courts have reviewed the question or the legislature responds, prudent creditors in Texas should observe prior notice and hearing procedures before exercising their self-help repossession rights under section 9.503.
73. For an excellent discussion and several examples of form waivers, see John
Krahmer, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical
Study, 4 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 23, 43-44 (1972).
74. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203.
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